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STATE OF NEW YORK - BOARD OF PAROLE 
ADMJNISTRATIVE APPEAL DECISION NOTICE 






Appearances: Glenn Kroll Esq. 
92 Main Street · 
P.O. Box 10 
Bloomingburg, New York 12721 
Decision appealed: August 2018 decision, denying discretionary release and imposing a hold of 24-
months. 
Board Member(s) Berliner, Cruse, Shapiro 
who participated: 
Papers considered: Appellant's Brief received December 19, 2018 
Appeals Unit Review: Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and Recommendation 
Records relied upon: Pre-Sentence Investigation Report, Parole Board Report, Interview Transcript, Parole 
Ii 
Board Release Decision Notice (Form 9026), COMPAS instrument, Offender Case 
Plan. 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
_Vacated, remanded for de novo interview _Modified to ___ _ 
If the Final Determination is at variance with Findings and Recommendation of Appeals Unit, written 
reasons for the Parole Board's determination!!!.!!!! be annexed hereto. 
This Final Determination, the related Statement of the Appeals Unit's Findings and the separate findings of 
the Parole Board, if any, were mailed to the Inmate and the Inmate's Counsel, if any, on ~£.B /Jr; 66 . .. -r, . 
·I )i~1rihutinn: Appeals Unit -- Appcllmn - App01lanfs Counsel - Inst. Parole File - C~ntral File 
l'-2(102IB > ~I I ! ]() I fO 
STATE OF NEW YORK – BOARD OF PAROLE 
APPEALS UNIT FINDINGS & RECOMMENDATION 
Name: Kovacs, Stuart DIN: 97-A-1247  
Facility: Woodbourne CF AC No.:  08-113-18 B 
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    Appellant challenges the August 2018 determination of the Board, denying release and imposing 
a 24-month hold. Appellant raises the following issues: 1) the Board decision is arbitrary and 
capricious in that they failed to consider and/or properly weigh the required statutory factors. 
Rather, they only looked at the instant offense. 2) the Board violated his due process liberty interest 
in a legitimate expectation of early release. 3) the Board decision doesn’t satisfy the preponderance 
of the evidence standard. 4) the decision lacks detail. 5) he is being punished for maintaining his 
innocence, turning down a lighter plea bargain offer, and going to trial, by being re-sentenced to 
life without parole.  6)  the decision lacks future guidance. 7) the COMPAS and TAP were totally 
ignored.  8) the 24 month hold is excessive. 
 
     Discretionary release to parole is not to be granted “merely as a reward for good conduct or 
efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability 
that, if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that 
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness 
of his crime as to undermine respect for the law.”  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (emphasis added); 
accord Matter of Hamilton v. New York State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 
(3d Dept. 2014).  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A) requires the Board to consider criteria which is 
relevant to the specific inmate, including, but not limited to, the inmate’s institutional record and 
criminal behavior.  People ex rel. Herbert v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983). While consideration of these factors is mandatory, “the ultimate 
decision to parole a prisoner is discretionary.”  Matter of Silmon v. Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 477, 
718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 708 (2000).  Thus, it is well settled that the weight to be accorded the requisite 
factors is solely within the Board’s discretion.  See, e.g., Matter of Delacruz v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 
1413, 997 N.Y.S.2d 872 (4th Dept. 2014); Matter of Hamilton, 119 A.D.3d at 1271, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
at 717; Matter of Garcia v. New York State Div. of Parole, 239 A.D.2d 235, 239, 657 N.Y.S.2d 
415, 418 (1st Dept. 1997).  The Board need not explicitly refer to each factor in its decision, nor give 
them equal weight.  Matter of Betancourt v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1497, 49 N.Y.S.3d 315 (3d Dept. 
2017); Matter of LeGeros v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 139 A.D.3d 1068, 30 N.Y.S.3d 834 
(2d Dept. 2016); Matter of Phillips v. Dennison, 41 A.D.3d 17, 21, 834 N.Y.S.2d 121, 124 (1st 
Dept. 2007).   
 
     Although the Board placed emphasis on the crime (murder 2nd degree conviction, with a  
sentence of 20 years to life), the record reflects it also considered other appropriate factors and it 
was not required to place equal weight on each factor considered.  Matter of Peralta v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.3d 1151, 69 N.Y.S.3d 885 (3d Dept. 2018). Although the Board placed 
emphasis on the crime, it was free to do so given all factors need not be given equal weight.  Matter 
of Arena v. New York State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 156 A.D.3d 1101, 65 N.Y.S.3d 
471 (3d Dept. 2017). 
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     Although the Board placed particular emphasis on the nature of the crime, the Board considered 
other factors and was not required to give equal weight to or discuss each factor considered.  Matter 
of Gordon v. Stanford, 148 A.D.3d 1502, 50 N.Y.S.3d 627 (3d Dept. 2017).   
      Inmate's unwillingness to accept responsibility for violent crime is a sufficient basis for denying 
parole. Webb v Travis, 26 A.D.3d 614, 810 N.Y.S.2d 233 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den. 7 N.Y.3d 709, 822 
N.Y.S.2d 483; Okafor v. Russi, 222 A.D.2d 920, 635 N.Y.S.2d 340 (3d  Dept. 1995); Epps v Travis, 
241 A.D.2d 738, 660 N.Y.S.2d 1016, 1017 (3d Dept. 1997). The Board may emphasize the inmate’s 
failure to take responsibility for the criminal offense. Cruz v Alexander, 67 A.D.3d 1240, 890 
N.Y.S.2d 656 (3d Dept. 2009); Abdur-Raheem v New York State Board of Parole, 78 A.D.3d 1412, 
911 N.Y.S.2d 257 (3d Dept. 2010); Khatib v New York State Board of Parole, 118 A.D.3d 1207, 
988 N.Y.S.2d 286 (3d Dept. 2014); Crawford v New York State Board of Parole, 144 A.D.3d 1308, 
46 N.Y.S.3d 228 (3d Dept. 2016). The Court dismissed a challenge to parole denial based on an 
attempt to blame the victims.  Matter of Marcelin v. Travis, 262 A.D.2d 836, 836, 693 N.Y.S.2d 
639, 640 (3d Dept. 1999).   
 
    The Board may consider a district attorney’s recommendation to deny parole.  Matter of 
Applegate v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 2164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 
2018); Matter of Porter v. Alexander, 63 A.D.3d 945, 881 N.Y.S.2d 157 (2d Dept. 2009); Matter of 
Walker v. Travis, 252 A.D.2d 360, 676 N.Y.S.2d 52 (1st Dept. 1998); Matter of Walker v. New 
York State Bd. of Parole, 218 A.D.2d 891, 630 N.Y.S.2d 417 (3d Dept. 1995); Matter of Williams v. 
New York State Bd. of Parole, 220 A.D.2d 753, 633 N.Y.S.2d 182 (2d Dept. 1995); Matter of Confoy 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 173 A.D.2d 1014, 569 N.Y.S.2d 846, 847 (3d Dept. 1991); Matter 
of Lynch v. New York State Div. of Parole, 82 A.D.2d 1012, 442 N.Y.S.2d 179 (3d Dept. 1981).  
    An inmate has no Constitutional right to be conditionally released on parole before expiration 
of a valid sentence.  Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal & Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 
1, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2104 (1979); Matter of Russo v. Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982 
(1980); Matter of Vineski v. Travis, 244 A.D.2d 737, 664 N.Y.S.2d 391 (3d Dept. 1997).  The 
New York State parole scheme “holds out no more than a possibility of parole” and thus does not 
create a protected liberty interest implicating the due process clause.  Matter of Russo, 50 N.Y.2d 
at 75-76, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 985; see also Barna v. Travis, 239 F.3d 169, 171 (2d Cir. 2001); Matter 
of Freeman v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005). 
         Completion of the minimum term of the sentence still does not create any protected liberty 
interest. Motti v Alexander, 54 A.D.3d 1114, 1115 (3d Dept. 2008). 
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     Nothing in the due process clause requires the Parole Board to specify the particular evidence 
on which rests the discretionary determination an inmate is not ready for conditional release. 
Duemmel v Fischer, 368 Fed.Appx. 180, 182 (2d Cir. 2010). There is no due process requirement 
that the Parole Board disclose its release criteria.  Haymes v Regan, 525 F.2d 540 (2d Cir. 1975). 
    The due process clause is not violated by the Board’s balancing of the statutory criteria, and 
which is not to be second guessed by the courts. Mathie v Dennison, 2007 WL 2351072 (S.D.N.Y. 
2007); MacKenzie v Cunningham, 2014 WL 5089395 (S.D.N.Y. 2014). 
    Parole is not constitutionally based, but is a creature of statute which may be imposed subject to 
conditions imposed by the state legislature. Banks v Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 
(2d Dept. 2018).   
    A substantial/preponderance of the  evidence issue arises only where a quasi-judicial hearing has 
been held and evidence has been taken pursuant to law. If no hearing was held, the issue does not 
arise. Horace v Annucci, 133 A.D.3d 1263, 20 N.Y.S.3d 492 (4th Dept. 2015). A proceeding to 
determine whether an inmate should be released on parole is not a quasi-judicial hearing. Banks v 
Stanford, 159 A.D.3d 134, 71 N.Y.S.3d 515 (2d Dept. 2018). So there are no evidence issues. 
     The Board’s decision satisfied the criteria set out in Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a), as it was 
sufficiently detailed to inform the inmate of the reasons for the denial of parole.  Matter of Applegate 
v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 164 A.D.3d 996, 997, 82 N.Y.S.3d 240 (3d Dept. 2018); Matter of 
Kozlowski v. New York State Bd. of Parole, 108 A.D.3d 435, 968 N.Y.S.2d 87 (1st Dept. 2013); 
Matter of Little v. Travis, 15 A.D.3d 698, 788 N.Y.S.2d 628 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of Davis v. 
Travis, 292 A.D.2d 742, 739 N.Y.S.2d 300 (3d Dept. 2002); People ex rel. Herbert v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881 (1st Dept. 1983).   
      Nothing in the Board’s decision indicates a permanent denial of parole consideration. Hodge v 
Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014). 
      Once an individual has been convicted of a crime, it is generally not the Board’s role to 
reevaluate a claim of innocence. Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 N.Y.2d 470, 718 N.Y.S.2d 704, 
708 (2000);  Copeland v New York State Board of Parole, 154 A.D.3d 1157, 63 N.Y.S.3d 548 (3d 
Dept. 2017). The record does not support appellant’s contention that the Board improperly took 
into account the inmate’s decision to go to trial. Cody v Dennison, 33 A.D.3d 1141, 822 N.Y.S.2d 
677 (3d Dept. 2006), lv.den.8 N.Y.3d 802, 830 N.Y.S.2d 698. 
 
     As for Appellant’s complaint about lack of future guidance, the Board is not required to state 
what an inmate should do to improve his chances for parole in the future.  Matter of Francis v. New 
York State Div. of Parole, 89 A.D.3d 1312, 934 N.Y.S.2d 514 (3d Dept. 2011); Matter of Freeman 
v. New York State Div. of Parole, 21 A.D.3d 1174, 800 N.Y.S.2d 797 (3d Dept. 2005); Matter of 
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Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc.3d 896, 969 N.Y.S.2d 733 (Sup. Ct. Albany Co. 2013), aff’d, 117 A.D.3d 
1258, 984 N.Y.S.2d 894 (3d Dept. 2014), lv. denied, 24 N.Y.3d 901, 995 N.Y.S.2d 710 (2014).   
     As for the TAP, Corrections Law 71-a and 112(4) have no guarantee  of release upon an 
inmate’s successful completion of programs. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(SDNY 2014). 
     The 2011 amendments did not eliminate the requirement that the Board conduct a case-by-case 
review of each inmate by considering the statutory factors including the instant offense.  The 
amendments also did not change the three substantive standards that the Board is required to apply 
when deciding whether to grant parole.  Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Thus, the COMPAS 
cannot mandate a particular result.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 
(3d Dept. 2016).  Rather, the COMPAS is an additional consideration that the Board must weigh 
along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three standards are 
satisfied.  See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 990 N.Y.S.2d 
295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d 
Dept. 2014); see also Matter of Gonzalvo v. Stanford, 153 A.D.3d 1021, 56 N.Y.S.3d 896 (3d Dept. 
2017).  That is exactly what occurred here.  The 2011 amendments did not change the three 
substantive standards that the Board is required to apply when deciding whether to grant parole, 
namely (1) whether “there is a reasonable probability that, if such inmate is released, he will live 
and remain at liberty without violating the law”; (2) whether release “is not incompatible with the 
welfare of society”; and (3) whether release “will not so deprecate the seriousness of his crime as 
to undermine respect for law.” Executive Law § 259-i(2)(c)(A).  Here, the Board relied on the 
second and third standards in denying release.  Even uniformly low COMPAS scores and other 
evidence of rehabilitation would not resolve the broader questions of society’s welfare, public 
perceptions of the seriousness of a crime, or whether release would undermine respect for the law.  
Thus, the COMPAS cannot mandate a particular result, and declining to afford the COMPAS 
controlling weight does not violate the 2011 amendments.  Matter of King v. Stanford, 137 A.D.3d 
1396, 26 N.Y.S.3d 815 (3d Dept. 2016). The COMPAS is an additional consideration that the 
Board must weigh along with the statutory factors for the purposes of deciding whether the three 
standards are satisfied. See Matter of Rivera v. N.Y. State Div. of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1107, 1108, 
990 N.Y.S.2d 295 (3d Dept. 2014); accord Matter of Dawes v. Annucci, 122 A.D.3d 1059, 994 
N.Y.S.2d 747 (3d Dept. 2014). 
    Denial of parole is neither arbitrary nor capricious when the Parole Board relied on the factors 
defined by the New York statute. Hodge v Griffin, 2014 WL 2453333(S.D.N.Y. 2014) citing 
Romer v Travis, 2003 WL 21744079.  An arbitrary action is one without sound basis in reason and 
without regard to the facts. Rationality is what is reviewed under an arbitrary and capricious 
standard. Hamilton v New York State Division of Parole, 119 A.D.3d 1268, 990 N.Y.S.2d 714 (3d 
Dept. 2014). An action is arbitrary and capricious when it is taken without sound basis in reason 
or regard to the facts. Ward v City of Long Beach, 20 N.Y.3d 1042 (2013). 
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     In the absence of a convincing demonstration that the Board did not consider the statutory 
factors, it must be presumed that the Board fulfilled its duty.  Matter of Fuchino v. Herbert, 255 
A.D.2d 914, 914, 680 N.Y.S.2d 389, 390 (4th Dept. 1998); Matter of McLain v. New York State 
Div. of Parole, 204 A.D.2d 456, 611 N.Y.S.2d 629 (2d Dept. 1994); Matter of McKee v. New York 
State Bd. of Parole, 157 A.D.2d 944, 945, 550 N.Y.S.2d 204, 205 (3d Dept. 1990); People ex rel. 
Herbert, 97 A.D.2d 128, 468 N.Y.S.2d 881. 
     The Board’s decision to hold an inmate for the maximum period of 24 months is within the 
Board’s discretion and within its authority pursuant to Executive Law § 259-i(2)(a) and 9 
N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3(b).1  Matter of Tatta v. State of N.Y., Div. of Parole, 290 A.D.2d 907, 737 
N.Y.S.2d 163 (3d Dept. 2002), lv. denied, 98 N.Y.2d 604, 746 N.Y.S.2d 278 (2002); see also 
Matter of Campbell v. Evans, 106 A.D.3d 1363, 965 N.Y.S.2d 672 (3d Dept. 2013).  Appellant 
has failed to demonstrate that a hold of 24 months for discretionary release was excessive or 
improper. 
Recommendation:  Affirm. 
                                                 
1 For interviews conducted before the 2017 amendments, the provision was found at 9 N.Y.C.R.R. § 8002.3 
(d) (2014) 
